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ABSTRACT 
Cyberbullying in schools is increasing on an alarming rate. The 
development of the Internet and smartphone technology have 
increased the potential scope of a school authority’s duty of care for 
its students. A question frequently asked by educators is “Where 
does a school authority’s duty of care end in the interconnected, 
24/7 world of the Internet?” This paper argues that a duty of care 
will be owed where the school is in a school/student relationship 
with its students. That relationship can exist outside the school gates 
and outside of school hours. 
There are no decisions of senior appellate courts that deal with a 
school authority’s liability for cyberbullying. The authors, 
therefore, analyse the nature of the relationship to identify the key 
features that must be present to establish the existence of a duty of 
care. Three features are identified as critical to the existence of the 
duty of care outside of the normal school hours. They are the extent 
to which the school authority controls or ought to control a given 
situation, the extent to which it has encouraged students to 
participate in a particular activity and the extent to which a school 
authority is aware or ought to be aware of risks associated with the 
relevant activity of its students. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
At 5am on 5 February 2010, 17 year old Allem Halkic ended his life by 
jumping from Melbourne’s West Gate Bridge. He had been receiving 
threatening text messages from his friend Shane Philip Gerada. Gearda 
pleaded guilty to stalking and was placed on an 18 month Community 
Based Order. He reflected on what had happened saying: ‘I did not realise 
the effect of my words’.1 
Welcome to the terrifying reality of cyberbullying. Cyberbullying is the 
deliberate, repeated and hostile use of information and communication 
technologies that seeks to intimidate, control, manipulate, put down or 
humiliate a victim.
2
 It extends from situations of petty nastiness or cruelty 
through to identity theft, harassment, stalking, and threats of physical 
harm.
3
 
In practical terms, today’s school bullies participate in all the traditional 
physical and psychological schoolyard bullying that generations of school 
kids have indulged in or struggled to survive. But the advent of mobile 
phones and the World Wide Web have increased their arsenal: school 
bullies create wikis and blogs; circulate emails, post images, message 
                                           
1
  Selma Milovanovic, ‘Man avoids jail in first cyber bullying case ‘, The Age 
(online) 9 April 2010 <http://www.theage.com.au/victoria/man-avoids-jail-in-first-
cyber-bullying-case-20100408-rv3v.html> and see the report of the report of the 
Coroner, Inquest into the Death of Allem Halkic Court reference COR 2009 0655 
dated 27 June 2012. 
2
  Bill Belsey, Always On? Always Aware! (17 January 2007) Cyberbullying  
<http://www.cyberbullying.ca>; Youth Affairs Council of Victoria Inc, Sticks and 
stones and mobile phones: outcomes on a forum on bullying and young people in 
Victoria  (November 2009) 12.  
3
  Kelly Tallon et al, 'New Voices / New Laws : school-age young people in 
New South Wales speak out about the criminal laws that apply to their online 
behaviour' (Research Report, National Children's and Youth Law Centre and Legal 
Aid NSW, November 2012) 14-5.  
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texts and images, upload, download and network unsociably to harm their 
victims.
4
 In short, they use all the tools that are their inheritance as 
internet natives to hurt and humiliate their victims or, simply, to have fun 
at others’ expense. This is the brave new world of cyberbullying where 
the bully has the advantage of anonymity.
5
  With a few keystrokes the 
harm is done. From the bully’s perspective, it is a bloodless sport. The 
online bully cannot see the bleeding nose or the despair in the eye of his 
or her victim.
6
 
As with all bullying, there is a perceived or actual power imbalance. The 
victim’s perception is that he or she is less powerful than the bully. In 
traditional bullying, the imbalance may be caused by the bully’s greater 
strength. In cyberbullying the relative physical strength of those involved 
is relevant. The imbalance may be caused by the bully’s greater 
technological skills.
7
 
Cyberbullying does not recognise geographical boundaries: school gates 
cannot keep it out and the victim’s home is no refuge. Once posted to the 
internet, cyberbullying is up and running 24/7.
8
 Perhaps, most 
disturbingly, once on the internet, the hurtful post or the humiliating 
image has indefinite virtual life and the potential audience is exponential 
                                           
4
  Sheri Bauman, ‘Cyber bullying: a virtual menace’ (Paper presented at 
National Coalition Against Bullying National Conference, Melbourne, November 2 – 
4, 2007) 3.  
5
  Aashish Srivastava and Janice Boey, 'Online Bullying and Harrassment: An 
Australian Perspective,' (2012) 6 Masaryk University Journal of Law and Technology 
299, 305.  
6
  Robert Slonje and Peter K Smith, ‘Cyberbullying: Another main type of 
bullying?’ (2008) April, 49:2 Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 147 
<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.ipacez.nd.edu.au/enhanced/doi/10.1111/j.1467-
9450.2007.00611.x/>. 
7
  Elizabeth Whittaker & Robin M. Kowalski (2015) ‘Cyberbullying Via Social 
Media’ (2015) 14(1) Journal of School Violence, 11, 12. 
8
  Srivastava and Boey, above n 6, 305.  
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– especially if the bullying post, video or image goes viral.9 It is little 
wonder cyberbullying is causing school authorities, teachers, parents and 
guardians increasing concern and despair. 
II THE ELEMENTS OF NEGLIGENCE 
How are school authorities supposed to react to the continually evolving 
world of bullying on the internet? Is it possible to draw clear lines of 
legal responsibility? Where and when, for example, does a school’s duty 
of care to its students start and finish? 
A school authority’s liability in tort is based on the duty of care it owes to 
those who have a relationship with it. It is the nature of the relationship 
that determines the extent and scope of the duty. A school authority, for 
example, owes a duty of care to its students for situations that can be said 
to be part of the duty relationship of school and student.
10
 However, the 
following discussion indicates that the existence of that relationship is not 
necessarily limited to when the student is on school premises during 
school hours or at a school event.
11
 
Of course, the existence of a duty of care is a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition of liability in negligence. Having established that a 
duty of care exists, a court must establish that: 
 
                                           
9
  Marilyn Campbell, Des Butler and Sally Kift, 'School's Duty to Provide a 
Safe Learning Environment: Does this Include Cyberbullying,' (2008) 13 Australian 
and New Zealand Journal of Law and Education 21, 22. 
10
  Phillip T Slee and David C Ford, 'Bullying is a Serious Issue - it is a Crime' 
(1999) 4 Australia & New Zealand Journal of Law & Education 23, 33; The 
Commonwealth of Australia v Introvigne (1981) 150 CLR 258.  
11
  Geyer v Downs (1977) 138 CLR 91; Commonwealth v Introvigne (1982) 150 
CLR 258; and Reynolds v Haines (SC(NSW) Common Law Division, McLaughlin M, 
27 October 1993, unreported); Katherine A. Lindsay, 'After the Bell: School 
Authorities' Duty of Care to Pupils After School Hours Case Note' (1997) 2 Australia 
& New Zealand Journal of Law & Education 101. 
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1. the school authority breached its duty to the student; 
2. the breach caused harm to the student; and 
3. the harm was not too remote 12 
to find that a school authority is liable to the student in negligence. A 
close reading of the cases indicates that the questions of the existence of 
the duty of care, the breach, causation and remoteness are very closely 
related and considerations of them by the Courts tend to blur.
13
   
However, the precondition of the school authority being legally 
responsible for the effects of cyberbullying only arise once the existence 
of a duty of care has been established. Therefore, focus should be placed 
on understanding the factors that limit a school authority’s duty of care in 
the minefield created by the internet. In particular focus should be placed 
on the existence and scope of the duty of care owed by a school authority 
for events that occur outside of school hours and away for school 
premises. Causation and remoteness are beyond the scope of this article. 
There has not yet been a decision by an appellate court in Australia on the 
duty of school authorities for cyberbullying.
14
 Therefore, we have to go 
back to basic principles to establish the limits of a school authority’s 
liability and apply those principles to cyberbullying. We also draw on 
analogies from the law of workers’ compensation to see where the Courts 
have found that an employment relationship exists – outside of the work 
environment and outside of work hours. The use of these analogies is, 
this paper argues, justified because the rapidly evolving nature of the 
                                           
12
  RP Balkin and JLR Davis, Law of Torts (LexisNexis Butterworths, 5th ed, 
2013) 192.  
13
  Prue Vines, Peter Handford and Carol Harlow, ‘Duty of Care’ in Carolyn 
Sappideen and Prue Vines (eds), Fleming’s The Law of Torts (Lawbook, 2011), 151, 
152. 
14
  Campbell, Butler and Kift, above n 10, 25.  
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employment relationship has raised very similar issues – albeit in a 
different context to the school authority/student relationship. 
The authors’ conclusion is that there is no hard and fast guide to where 
the duty relationship starts and finishes outside the school gates and 
outside of school hours. There are, however, factors that increase the risk 
that a school authority may be held responsible that can be distilled from 
the cases. The risk that a school authority owes a duty of care will be 
greater where the school authority: 
 has knowledge or ought to have knowledge that a risk of harm to 
its students exist; 
 has control or ought to have control of a particular situation; and 
 has induced or encouraged its students to take part in a particular 
activity. 
Critical to the law’s thinking in relation to the existence of a duty of care, 
is the awareness that students are particularly vulnerable; given their age 
and inexperience, students are prone to mischief. As a result they depend 
on the school authority to provide a safe environment for the student to 
work and socialize in when the relationship of student and school exists. 
A Back to basic: The school authority’s duty of care 
In this ever-morphing environment, it is not possible to draw absolutely 
clear lines of legal responsibility. The duty of care relationship, which is 
the foundation of liability in negligence, arises in situations where the 
relationship of school and student exist.
15
 In particular, that relationship 
exists in situations where the school has control or ought to be exercising 
                                           
15
  Slee and Ford, above n 11, 33; The Commonwealth of Australia v Introvigne 
(1981) 150 CLR 258.  
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control to ensure that its students’ learning and social environment are 
safe.
16
 Or, to look at it from the students’ or their parents/‘guardians’ 
perspective, a duty will arise in situations where it is legitimate for the 
student or his or her parents/guardians to depend on the school to provide 
a safe learning and social environment – regardless of whether the 
relevant activity takes physically place at the school or on the internet. 
The greater the obligation of the school authority to control a given 
situation, the more likely it is that a court will find that a duty of care 
exists.
17
  
In the older duty of care cases there is often a physical connection 
between the school and the student: when a school opens its gates to 
students,
18
 takes them on excursions or stages an event for its students,
19
 
the cases make clear that the school authority owes a duty of care to its 
students. The internet and mobile phones, however, potentially extend the 
school/student relationship way beyond the physical boundaries of a 
school or the location of an excursion and way outside of school hours. 
While many cases of cyberbullying lack this physical connection, there 
are useful principles that can be drawn from the older school negligence 
cases that shed light on the extent on the limits of liability of school 
authorities for cyberbullying in negligence. The duty of a school authority 
to provide a safe environment for its students has been described as a 
‘personal duty’ that cannot be delegated to another person or entity.20 
This means that, even if the school authority engages another person or 
                                           
16
  Kondis v State Transport Authority (1984) 154 CLR 672, 684-7 cited with 
approval in New South Wales v Lepore [2003] HCA 4, [35].  
17
  Ibid.  
18
  Commonwealth v Introvigne (1982) 150 CLR 258. 
19
  Guigiatti v Servite College Council Inc (2004) Aus Torts Reports 81-724, 
[19].  
20
  Campbell, Butler and Kift, above n 10, 25. 
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entity to discharge its duties, it is legally responsible for the consequences 
of that other person or entity’s negligence even if it has little, if any, 
control, over how that other person or entity carries out the work. It still 
has a duty to ensure that a safe environment is provided to its students.
21
 
The non-delegable nature of the duty arises because of the vulnerability 
of the students and their dependence on the school authority to ensure 
that a safe environment is provided.
22
 
A school authority can be directly responsible for its own failure to 
provide a safe environment for its students.
23
 Examples of the potential 
for direct liability occurs when a school authority employs an unsuitable 
teacher without carrying out proper reference checking, fails to supervise 
its staff properly or fails to ensure that its policies on internet use and 
appropriate behaviour are complied with and a student is harmed as a 
result.
24
 
In addition to the personal responsibility of a school authority, it can be 
legally responsible for the negligence of its staff provided that the 
negligence occurred in the course of the staff member’s employment. In 
Ramsay v Larsen,
25
 Kitto J said that: 
...a schoolmaster's power of reasonable chastisement exists, at least 
under a system of compulsory education, not by virtue of a 
delegation by the parent at all, but by virtue of the nature of the 
                                           
21
 Commonwealth v Introvigne (1982) HCA 40, [27]–[29] (Mason J). 
22
  New South Wales v Lepore [2003] HCA 4, [100] (Gaudron J). 
23
  Commonwealth v Introvigne 150 CLR 258, 269; cited in Watson v Haines 
(1987) ATR ¶80-094, 3; Carmarthenshire County Council v Lewis (1985) AC 549, 
270.  
24
  New South Wales v Lepore [2003] HCA 4 [2] (Gleeson CJ). 
25
  Ramsay v Larsen [1964] HCA 40.  
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relationship of schoolmaster and pupil and the necessity inherent in 
that relationship of maintaining order in and about the school.
 26
 
His Honour went on to explain that a school authority is liable for the 
failure of its staff to take due care of a student. This is the notion of 
vicarious liability.
27
 Because of this principle, a school authority may be 
liable for those whom it employs to care for its students.
28
 His Honour’s 
focus is on the nature of the relationship of schoolmaster and pupil and 
the school master’s obligation to maintain order as the heart of the duty 
relationship.  
Justice Taylor emphasized the importance of the student becoming 
subject to the ‘care and authority of masters’.29 
As argued in the rest of this paper, later cases are consistent and that the 
duty of care arises when the relationship of teacher/school authority and 
student exists. Authority is based on control. So, it can be said, in 
situations where a school authority exercises or should exercise control 
based on their authority – a duty of care will arise.  
Students’ immaturity and their talent for getting up to no good are key 
considerations. According to Mason J, children’s talent for trouble 
imposes a ‘special responsibility on a school authority to care for their 
safety, one that goes beyond a mere vicarious liability for the acts and 
omissions of its servants’.30 The same point was made by Murphy J: ‘The 
standard of care must take into account the well-known mischievous 
                                           
26
  Ibid [7]. 
27
  Martin Davies and Ian Malkin, Torts (LexisNexis Butterworths, 6th ed, 
2012) 633.  
28
  Ramsay v Larsen [1964] HCA 40, [10]. 
29
  Ibid [38]. 
30
 Commonwealth v Introvigne (1982) HCA 40, [30] (Mason J).  
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propensities of children, especially in relation to attractions and lures with 
obvious or latent hazards.’31   
The leading Australian case on the duty of care owed by a school to its 
students is Geyer v Downs.
32
 It is clear from that decision that the school 
can create the relationship irrespective of whether or not a particular 
activity occurred in school hours. Justice Stephen pointed out that the 
duty owed by a teacher (or a school authority) to a pupil arises from the 
relationship between them. It is not determined by school hours but by 
reference to periods when the student is entrusted to the school ‘for the 
purpose of his education.’33 His Honour went on to say that: 
The temporal ambit of the duty will, therefore, depend not at all upon 
the schoolmaster's ability, however derived, effectively to perform 
the duty but, rather, upon whether the particular circumstances of the 
occasion in question reveal that the relationship of schoolmaster and 
pupil was or was not then in existence. If it was, the duty will apply. 
It will be for the schoolmaster and those standing behind him to cut 
their coats according to the cloth, not assuming the relationship when 
unable to perform the duty which goes with it. 
34
 
What is critical is that the duty goes with the relationship and that is not 
dependent on the negligence occurring in school hours.  
Significantly, Stephen J also emphasised that the duty arises when the 
student is ‘beyond the control and protection of his parent.’ 35   His 
Honour’s warning to schools that they should not extend their duty of 
                                           
31
  Ibid [2].  
32
  Geyer v Downs [1977] HCA 64.  
33
  Ibid [5]. His Honour cited the decision of Winneke CJ in Richards v Victoria 
(1996) VR 136, 138-9 about the nature of the duty with approval.  
34
  Geyer v Downs [1977] HCA 64, [6].  
35
  Citing the judgment of Winneke CJ in Richards v. Victoria (1969) VR 136, 
138-9. 
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care to relationship to situations where they are unable to provide a safe 
environment is excellent advice. 
The scary reality is that, in the messy world of cyberbullying, students, as 
internet natives, may be beyond the control of his or her parents and his 
or her school. 
Justices Murphy and Aicken, in their joint judgment, made a vital point 
that the nature and extent of the duty of care relationship is, in large part, 
determined by the culture in which the relationship arises: 
 ... What may be a useful guide [from the nineteenth century cases on 
the nature and extent of the duty of care] applicable to a village or a 
small country school cannot be of direct assistance in the case of a 
large city or suburban school with some hundreds of children 
attending it.
 36
 
In other words, the social context in which the schooling is carried out 
plays a key role in determining the extent and scope of the duty of care. 
Consequently, the nature of the duty changes as the cultural context 
changes.  
This has obvious relevance to nature and extent of a school authority’s 
potential liability in the internet and smart phone age. The key point 
being that a school authority’s duty or care maybe extended to include 
maintaining proper supervision, having appropriate policies and training 
of any website, blog, wiki or other internet wonderland that it created or 
is responsible for.  
                                           
36
  Geyer v Downs [1977] HCA 64, [18]. 
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If the duty is not dependent on the negligence occurring in school hours, 
it is also clear that the existence of the duty is not dependent on the 
negligence occurring in school premises or on a school sponsored event.  
In 1996, the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Trustees of the Roman 
Catholic Church for the Diocese of Bathurst v Koffman and anor 
considered the liability of a school authority for injuries sustained by a 12 
year old student who, after his school day had finished, walked 300 to 
400 meters to the bus stop.
37
 While waiting for the bus, students from a 
state high school adjoining the bus stop, harassed and threw objects at the 
plaintiff injuring him in the eye. Building on Geyer v Downs, Mahoney P, 
dissenting, was prepared to extent the school’s duty of care beyond the 
school boundaries:  
… the obligation of the school to do things for the safety of the 
pupil, will require to be done will depend upon the circumstances. 
Thus, if it is plain to the school that, immediately outside the 
school premises, there is a busy and therefore dangerous road, the 
school will ordinarily have an obligation to shepherd pupils of a 
young age across the road. But if, in the course of walking from 
school to home, the student has reason to cross a busy road two 
kilometres from the school, it does not follow that the obligation 
of the school to take precautions for the safety of the student will 
involve that it shepherd the student across the road. 38 
The fact that the school has the capacity to influence what happens 
‘immediately outside the school premises.’39 The further the student is 
from the school and therefore the more outside the school’s control, the 
                                           
37
  Lindsay, above n 12; Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese 
of Bathurst v Koffman and anor (1996) Aust Torts Report ¶81-339.  
38
  Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese of Bathurst v 
Koffman and anor (1996) Aust Torts Report ¶81-339, 63589. 
39
  Ibid.  
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less likely it is that a duty of care will arise. However, the distance may 
not rule out the existence of a duty of care where the school has particular 
knowledge of risks: 
 I do not mean by this that a school may not have some 
obligations in respect of pupil safety even two kilometres from 
the school. Thus, if the school was made aware that, at that 
place, the student was habitually molested, it might arguably 
have an obligation, inter alia, to draw that matter to the attention 
of the parents, the police or others. I have referred to these 
examples to illustrate that what the obligation to take precautions 
in respect of a pupil's safety will require the school to do will 
vary according to the circumstances of time, place and 
otherwise. 40  
Mahoney P’s analysis blends the questions of whether or not a duty of 
care exists with the question of what that duty requires. Once the school 
is aware of risk of a particularly dangerous situation immediately outside 
the school premises, it probably has obligations to supervise students in 
that unsafe situation. Indeed, according to Justice Mahoney, it is arguable 
that the school may have obligations that extend beyond the immediate 
vicinity of the school if it is aware of a particular risk.  
Although Mahoney P dissented, in broad terms, his view that a school’s 
duty is not limited by the school gates, was accepted by the rest of the 
Court of Appeal. Justice Sheller was of the view that the nature and 
extent of the duty is not dependent on the student being on school 
grounds: 
                                           
40
  Ibid.  
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I do not think the relationship of teacher and pupil begins each 
day when the pupil enters the school ground and terminates 
when the pupil leaves the school ground. Undoubtedly however 
a particular duty of care arises because of the pre-existing 
relationship.  
In my opinion the extent and nature of the duty of the teacher to 
the pupil is dictated by the particular circumstances. I do not 
think its extent is necessarily measured or limited by the 
circumstance that the final bell for the day has rung and the pupil 
has walked out the school gate.
 41
 
At its broadest, Koffman suggests that, if teachers are aware of a risk to 
their students, there may be a duty to take preventative steps or warn 
parents of the risk, even when it arises outside school grounds and outside 
of school hours.  
This has obvious implications for life on the internet where the school 
may be aware that a particular student has either been at risk of bullying 
or been a perpetrator of internet bullying. The school may also be aware 
that inappropriate posts or images are being placed on sites that it is 
responsible for. The knowledge of the risk in those circumstances is more 
likely to give rise to the existence of a duty on the school to mitigate or 
eliminate any risks to its students in those situations. 
Priestly JA agreed that a duty of care existed. For his Honour, the 
existence of a duty of care depends on the particular circumstances of the 
situation rather than the limit of school hours.
42
 
 
                                           
41
  Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese of Bathurst v 
Koffman and anor (1996) Aust Torts Report ¶81-339, 63597.  
42
  Ibid 63593.  
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However, there are limits to this extended duty. As Justice Shellar 
pointed out, an employer is not liable to ensure that an employee’s 
bathroom floor is not slippery.
43
 Similarly, the school’s duty is limited in 
scope and depends on the circumstances. His Honour gave the following 
example: 
The circumstances of a small country high school located 
beside a quiet street and a primary school located on a busy 
highway in a big city may be contrasted. In the first case older 
children leave the environs of the school in comparative safety. 
In the second small children emerge from the school into a 
situation of immediate danger. 44 
The consistent emphasis on the importance of the particular 
circumstances of the school and the student is a consistent theme in these 
judgments. They echo the stress placed by Murphy and Aicken JJ on 
cultural context in Geyer v Downs to understand the nature of the duty of 
care relationship.
45
  
In 2001, the decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal in 
Graham v The State of New South Wales demonstrated that there are 
limits to the duty of care.
46
  The Court considered the case of a young 
High School student with poor eye sight and balance. This student was 
severely injured crossing a busy road on her way home from High 
School.  
 
                                           
43
  Ibid 63597. 
44
  Ibid.  
45
  Geyer v Downs [1977] HCA 64, [30].  
46
  Graham v The State of New South Wales [2001] NSWCA 248.  
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Generally her mother would walk her home. Her mother asked the school 
to provide the student with transport if she was unavailable. The school 
declined to do so and notified the mother that it would not provide 
transport.
47
 On the day of the accident, the plaintiff’s mother did not walk 
home with the plaintiff. The plaintiff was injured crossing the busy road 
on her way home. She sued the State of New South Wales as the relevant 
school authority for her loss. She relied on Koffman to argue that the 
school owed a duty to transport her home if her mother was not available 
to walk her home. 
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. According to Meager JA: 
No doubt the school had a duty to take reasonable steps to protect 
the child whilst it was at school, and this it apparently did. There 
may also have been a duty to inform Miss Graham's parents that 
neither taxi nor bus was running, and this it certainly did. There is 
no duty, in my opinion, to go further to take precautions to escort a 
pupil like Miss Graham to her home. Except in exceptional 
circumstances the master/pupil relationship ceases to exist at the 
school boundary.
 48
  
Relevant factors where the plaintiff’s age, she was a twelve year old High 
School student, the school was aware of her difficulties but had let the 
parents know that it could not provide transport. Mason P said that: 
It doesn't really do anything, on the facts of this case, to assist the 
plaintiff in showing that the considered decision not to make 
                                           
47
  Graham v NSW (2001) 34 MVR 198, 198.  
48
  Ibid [5].  
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available this added form of protection was one which was 
unreasonable in the circumstances.
 49
  
The important point for schools to take from this case is that they need to 
be very clear about what they will take responsibility for and what they 
will not. The Court made clear that it is only in rare cases that the duty of 
care will extend beyond the school gate. 
 
B Duty of Care and scope of the duty must be considered 
together 
It is unreal to isolate the question of the existence of the duty of care from 
the other elements that must be established in a negligence claim. In 
Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales v Dederer,
50
 Gummow J 
observed that: 
...duties of care are not owed in the abstract. Rather, they are 
obligations of a particular scope, and that scope may be more or less 
expansive depending on the relationship in question. Secondly, 
whatever their scope, all duties of care are to be discharged by the 
exercise of reasonable care. They do not impose a more stringent or 
onerous burden.  
Regarding the first point, a duty of care involves a particular and 
defined legal obligation arising out of a relationship between an 
ascertained defendant (or class of defendants) and an ascertained 
plaintiff (or class of plaintiffs). 51 
                                           
49
  Ibid [9]. 
50
  Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales v Dederer [2007] HCA 42.  
51
  Ibid [42]–[44].  
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The existence of the duty of care always has a particular scope that is 
made up of a number of “particular and defined” legal obligations that are 
summarised in the obligation to take reasonable care. This is what we saw 
in Koffman where each judge of the Court of Appeal analysed the 
existence and scope of the duty of care owed by the School authority 
together. 
So, for example, the scope of the duty that is owed to a primary school 
child will be different from the duty owed to a High School student. As 
the student gets older, the demands of the duty of care change. Thus in 
Camkin v Bishop and another Goddard LJ held that: 
Boys of 14 and 16 at a public school are not to be treated as if 
they were infants at creches, and no headmaster is obliged to 
arrange for constant and perpetual watching out of school 
hours.52 
Justice Steytler in the West Australian Supreme Court cited this passage 
from Goddard LJ in Gugiatti v Servite College Council Inc.
53
 His 
Honour, giving the Court’s judgment, held that the School authority was 
not negligent in was not reasonable to expect one of its teachers 
preventing a sixteen year old on a school leadership camp from jumping 
over a modest creek and thereby injuring himself.
54
 
1 Employment analogies 
Analogies can be drawn from the law of employment where the law has 
had a similar struggle to keep abreast of rapid developments in working 
                                           
52
  Camkin v Bishop and another [1941] 2 All ER 713, 717 cited with approval 
by Steytler J in Gugiatti v Servite College Council Inc [2004] WASC 5, [23] 
(Gugiatti). 
53
   Gugiatti v Servite College Council Inc [2004] WASCA 5. 
54
  Ibid [24]. 
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relationships. Caution needs to be applied in working with these 
analogies because the cases we consider involves adults – who are not as 
vulnerable as children and can, therefore, be expected to be more 
responsible for their own safety. They are also concerned with the 
interpretation of the relationship based on construction of relevant 
statutes as opposed to the common law notion of a duty of care. 
Bearing those very important caveats in mind, the legal issues of where 
does the employment relationship end and, consequently, what are the 
limits of an employer’s liability, are very similar to that posed by the 
school authority/student relationship. These issues have been considered 
in the context of workers' compensation cases. 
In Hatzimanolis v ANI Corp Limited,
55
 the High Court considered 
whether an injury sustained by a worker on a sightseeing journey on his 
day off was sustained in the course of his employment for the purpose of 
section 9 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW). According to 
the joint judgment of Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh 
JJ, an activity is within the course of employment even though it is 
outside a period of actual work if ‘the employer, expressly or impliedly, 
has induced or encouraged the employee to spend the interval or interlude 
at a particular place or in a particular way.’56   
Their Honours noted an injury sustained in an interval between periods of 
actual work (eg, during a lunch break) is more likely to be interpreted as 
occurring in the course of employment than an injury occurring between 
two discrete periods of work.
57
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  Hatzimanolis v ANI Corp Limited (1992) 173 CLR 473. 
56
  Ibid [16]. 
57
  Ibid [15]. 
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The continued relevance of this test was considered by the High Court in 
Comcare v PVYW (PVYW).
58
 The respondent in that case was an 
employee of a Commonwealth Government agency. She provided 
training at a regional office of the agency. She stayed overnight in a hotel 
and had sexual intercourse with an acquaintance in the hotel room.  
Whilst making love, either she or her acquaintance, pulled a light fitting 
from its mount striking the respondent on the head – causing her physical 
injury and psychological harm. She argued that the injury occurred in the 
course of her employment under the Commonwealth’s Safety, 
Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988.
59
  
The High Court reiterated the Hatzimanolis test so that the employer is 
liable provided the employee is ‘… doing the very thing that the 
employer encouraged the employee to do, when the injury occurs.’60 
Merely requiring an employee to be present at a place is insufficient. 
Requiring the respondent to be present at a regional centre to conduct 
training where this necessitated her stay overnight did not attract liability 
if the employer had not also expressly or impliedly encouraged or 
induced the employee to engage in the very activity that caused the 
injury. Consequently, the injury did not occur in the course of the 
respondent’s employment.61 
 
                                           
58
  Comcare v PVYW (PVYW) [2013] HCA 41. 
59
  Section 5A(1)(b). 
60
  PVYW [35]; see Eric L Windholz, ‘Comcare v PVYW: Are Injuries 
Sustained While Having Sex on a  Business Trip Compensable’ (2014) 36(2) Sydney 
Law Review 345. 
61
  Ibid [46]–[49]. Eric Windholz in a very useful case note points out the 
significance of the different statutory provisions giving rise to workers’ compensation 
liability in different Australian jurisdictions (see ‘Comcare v PVYW: Are Injuries 
Sustained While Having Sec on a Business Trip Compensable’ (2014) 36(2) Sydney 
Law Review 345, 347.  
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Applying this to a school authority, this paper argues that if the school 
authority has expressly or impliedly encouraged or induced a student to 
engage in the online activity that caused the injury, this may be taken as 
an indication of an assumption of legal responsibility by the school. In 
this context, the school should be confident that the activity it encourages 
is risk free or, at the very least, it has done what is reasonably required to 
mitigate that risk by, for example, properly educating its students, having 
clear policies in place or moderating the activity.  
Of course, the question is always one of degree and what is appropriate 
will be determined by the nature of the activity and the student’s 
involvement in it. If the school is aware of particular risks of the online 
activity it is encouraging, then it should mitigate those risks or cease 
encouraging its students to take part in the activity. 
C The duty is to do what is reasonable - breach of the Duty 
of Care 
Having said that, schools are not required to eliminate risk altogether.
62
 
The law does not impose strict liability whereby a school authority may 
be liable for damage sustained by a plaintiff regardless of whether or not 
it acted reasonably.  
The decision of the High Court in Roman Catholic Church v Hadba,
63
 for 
example, makes clear that the school authority is not obliged to provide 
constant supervision in all possible places of risk. According to the joint 
judgment: 
Nor is it reasonable to have a system in which children are 
observed during particular activities for every single moment of 
                                           
62
   New South Wales v Lepore (2003) 212 CLR 511, 531. 
63
   Roman Catholic Church v Hadba [2005] HCA 31.  
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time - it is damaging to teacher-pupil relationships by removing 
even the slightest element of trust; it is likely to retard the 
development of responsibility in children, and it is likely to call 
for a great increase in the number of supervising teachers and in 
the costs of providing them.
 64
 
In determining what is reasonable, and thereby concluding whether or not 
the school authority has breached the duty of care it owes to students, in 
New South Wales the Court must apply section 5B of the Civil Liability 
Act, 2002 (NSW). This section states that: 
(1) A person is not negligent in failing to take precautions 
against a risk of harm unless: 
(a) the risk was foreseeable (that is, it is a risk of 
which the person knew or ought to have known), and 
(b) the risk was not insignificant, and 
(c) in the circumstances, a reasonable person in 
the person’s position would have taken those precautions. 
(2) In determining whether a reasonable person would 
have taken precautions against a risk of harm, the court is to 
consider the following (amongst other relevant things): 
(a) the probability that the harm would occur if 
care were not taken, 
(b) the likely seriousness of the harm, 
(c) the burden of taking precautions to avoid the 
risk of harm, 
                                           
64
  Ibid [25]–[26]. 
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(d) the social utility of the activity that creates the 
risk of harm. 65 
According to Ipp J, the lead designer of the wave of tort reform that hit 
Australia in 2002,
66
 this section was designed to embody the common law 
principles that come from Lord Reid in Wagon Mound No 2 [1967] AC 
388: 
If a real risk is something that would occur to the mind of a 
reasonable man in the position of the defendant's servant and 
which he would not brush aside as far-fetched, and if the criterion 
is to be what that reasonable man would have done in the 
circumstances, then surely he would not neglect such a risk if 
action to eliminate it presented no difficulty, involving no 
disadvantage, and required no expense.
 67
 
Lord Reid’s dicta was picked up by Mason CJ in Wyong Shire Council v 
Shirt: 
…when we speak of a risk of injury as being "foreseeable" we 
are not making any statement as to the probability or 
improbability of its occurrence, save that we are implicitly 
asserting that the risk is not one that is far-fetched or fanciful.
68
 
Having determined that a duty of care exists, Mason CJ explained that: 
... it is then for the tribunal of fact to determine what a reasonable 
man would do by way of response to the risk. The perception of the 
reasonable man’s response calls for a consideration of the 
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   Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 5B. 
66
   Martin Davies and Ian Malkin, Torts (LexisNexis Butterworths, 6th ed, 
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67
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116 Pelletier et al, Cyberbullying 2015 
magnitude of the risk and the degree of the probability of its 
occurrence, along with the expense, difficulty and inconvenience of 
taking alleviating action and any other conflicting responsibilities 
which the defendant may have. It is only when these matters are 
balanced out that the tribunal of fact can confidently assert what is 
the standard of response to be ascribed to the reasonable man 
placed in the defendant’s position. 69 
This has come to be known as the calculus of negligence.
70
  Essentially, 
school authorities have to carry out a risk assessment – a process with 
which we are all familiar from work health and safety requirements. The 
measure against which a school authority’s performance is judged is what 
a reasonable school authority would do in the circumstances. 
Therefore, the existence of a duty of care owed by a school authority to a 
student does not require perfection; it does not require the school 
authority to prevent injury to its students at all costs but it does require 
the school to take and enforce steps that are reasonable.  
An excellent decision on how section 5B is applied is the decision of the 
New South Wales Court of Appeal in State of New South Wales v 
Mikhael.
71
 The plaintiff in that case was the victim of a serious assault by 
T, a fellow year 8 student, at a High School operated by the State of New 
South Wales. The plaintiff sustained brain damage as a result of the 
assault by T following an argument in a class.   
The plaintiff alleged that his injury had been caused by the negligence of 
the school in failing to warn relevant teachers that T had a propensity for 
violence. The plaintiff alleged that the failure of the school to implement 
                                           
69
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70
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71
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its own policy of informing all relevant teachers of potential risks had 
been the cause of this assault and his injuries. Specifically, the plaintiff 
argued that the school failed to take reasonable care for him in 
circumstances where early male teenage students are known to be 
potentially violent and T, in particular, was known to be potentially 
violent.
72
 
Justice Beazley gave the decision of the Court. She emphasised the 
importance of foreseeability of risk of injury.
73
 Applying Mason CJ’s test 
of foreseeability from Wyong Shire Council, even a risk that is “quite 
unlikely” can be foreseeable provided it is not far-fetched or fanciful.74 
Given that T had carried out a serious assault only some weeks before he 
assaulted the plaintiff, the risk of injury was clearly foreseeable.
75
 Her 
Honour found the risk of harm was not insignificant and were such a 
reasonable person in the school’s position would have taken precautions 
to deal with the risk. 
Having satisfied the conditions set out in section 5B(1), her Honour 
applied the factors set out in sub-section (2). These factors are to be 
applied to “the extent that they are relevant”.76 The School had come to 
the conclusion that there was a low risk of T reoffending. However, if he 
did reoffend, the potential consequences could be and were very serious – 
they were certainly not potentially insignificant such that no precautions 
were necessary.
77
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The Court must then consider the burden of taking precautions. As her 
Honour points out, the burden is not to be analysed solely in economic 
terms. In this case, the obvious precaution was proper communication to 
relevant teachers who might have responsibility for T of his propensity 
for violence. To calculate the burden, it is legitimate to take into account 
“factors such as time or distance or communication”.78  Weighing the 
inconvenience of effective communication against T’s right to privacy. 
Justice Beazley said of this consideration that: 
It was the privacy concerns that had dictated that part of the 
school's procedures which created the risk of harm. Privacy 
concerns were appropriate and relevant considerations. However, a 
different or more sensitively calibrated privacy policy, having 
regard to particular circumstances, was required, so as to balance 
the concerns of the physical safety and emotional security of all 
students at the school. 79 
Given the serious risk of harm, the privacy policy had to be dealt with in 
a more considered manner. Ultimately, the potential risk was of such 
seriousness, that it was vital that the school should have ensured that all 
relevant staff members were informed of the risks created by T’s 
propensity for violence. 
Knowing these risks of injury exist that go beyond far-fetched or fanciful 
risks, schools must carry out a risk assessment – considering all the 
factors set out in section 5B. Having carried out that assessment it must 
do what a reasonable school authority would do in the circumstances. In 
carrying out that risk assessment, as discussed earlier, schools must be 
aware of the propensity of their students for mischief and, as Mikhael 
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illustrates, if the school is aware of the potential risks created by 
particular students, it must manage those risks effectively. So the risk 
assessment that schools are required to do must be done in full awareness 
of Murphy’s law that what can go wrong probably will go wrong  - 
especially when dealing with students.  
III CONCLUSION 
In summary, a duty of care will only arise in circumstances where the 
relationship of school and student or teacher and student arises. This 
relationship exists pre-eminently on school grounds when the school is 
open for business. However, as Koffman illustrates, the duty can arise 
outside the school grounds and outside of school hours – especially in 
situations where the school is on notice of the risks or ought to be on 
notice.  
The duty and this teacher/student relationship arises in situations where 
the school has control and the students legitimately depend on the school, 
its delegates, teachers or staff to be looking after the student. The Courts 
will be reluctant to hold that a duty exists in situations where the school 
has no control and the student is under the supervision of others. If for 
example, the student is in his or her home, the expectation will be that the 
parents or guardians of the student will have responsibility. 
The problem is, as discussed earlier, that the internet and smart phones do 
not respect front doors, or other boundaries. Lines of control and 
responsibility become blurred.  
Where the school clearly exercises control, it is clear there is a duty 
present. For example, If the school authority is responsible for a website, 
a blog, wiki or other social networking site, it will be expected to 
establish proper principles for the use of the internet, to educate its staff 
120 Pelletier et al, Cyberbullying 2015 
and students as to what is appropriate and what the limits are and to 
supervise what occurs on those sites.  
Similarly, schools will be expected to have clear and effective policies 
about the use of smart phones, tablets and other internet devices while 
students are under the control of the school. They will be expected to 
police those policies effectively. 
Where they are on notice that a particular student is vulnerable to 
bullying, they need to be alert to the needs of that student. Similarly, 
when a school is aware of the risks created by a particular student, it 
needs to take steps to mitigate or eliminate that risk if it is anything more 
than a far-fetched or fanciful one.   
The Courts have consistently drawn attention to the need of school 
authorities to have regard to students’ vulnerability and their propensity 
for mischief. They also need to bear in mind that the young can be 
ignorant of the effect of what they do on others.  
Bearing in mind that children are immature, school authorities should 
take particular care in relation to any online activities they encourage 
students to take part. We have seen in the employment cases, that Courts 
have been inclined to extend an employer’s responsibility to include 
situations that it has encouraged an employee to take part. There is no 
reason why the same kind of reasoning could not be applied to school 
authorities and students. 
The good news for school authorities is that its duty does not require it to 
moderate sites 24/7 or to wrap its students in internet free bubble wrap. A 
school can only do what is reasonable in the circumstances. This does not 
mean that a school should be content with doing what it has always done 
or what looks okay. Schools should not be content with drafting internet 
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policies and allowing them to gather dust on the IT shelves of the library 
or store them in some musty directory that no one ever refers to.  
Because children are immature and therefore vulnerable, school 
authorities owe a personal duty to their students. This duty arises because 
the student is dependent on the school to deliver the safe environment. 
So, while the requirements of the duty do not extend to creating a risk 
free haven, school authorities are best advised to discharge their duties by 
looking for and adopting best practice in their supervision of their own 
online facilities and in what they allow students to get up to using their 
own devices on school property. 
Young people do silly things – a bit like adults really. They have a 
propensity for mischief. The young man, Shane Gereada, who sent the 
menacing text messages to his friend, Allem Halkic, did not realise the 
consequences of his words and was, no doubt, appalled when they led to 
his friend taking his own life. School authorities need to educate those in 
their care about good internet citizenship and always be aware and 
watchful for the risk of harm that exists in this brave new world. With the 
tragic increase in youth suicides, the need for proper care by school 
authorities could never have been be greater. 
